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Chapter 1
1. Throughout this book, designations used to refer to the various regions of
the United States carry their modern denotations, with slight amendments that
reflect the political realities of the period (e.g., Virginia includes current-day West
Virginia) or as noted.
Chapter 2
1. The survey is meant, not to be exhaustive, but rather to discuss the major
studies.
2. A rise in the real daily (or monthly) real wage may not imply a rise in the
annual standard of living, if annual days of work decline sufficiently and the decline
is involuntary (i.e., unemployment, see chap. 7) or if the rise in the wage compen-
sates for more adverse working conditions (see chap. 3). If neither condition ob-
tains, however, real consumption can increase and the worker is better off.
3. The manuscript 1850 Census of Manufactures and the manuscript and pub-
lished 1860 Census of Manufactures provide additional wage evidence for manu-
facturing; these can be combined with the 1820 census and the McLane Report to
produce estimates of average annual wages in manufacturing for four years (see
Sokoloff and Villaflor 1992). Because of geographic limitations in the census, the
Sokoloff-Villaflor series cover only the Northeast.
4. The absence of firm weights led Abbott (1905) and Hansen (1925) to choose
the Aldrich over the Weeks Report. Lebergott (1964), however, made a persuasive
case that the Weeks Report was superior to the Aldrich Report; its coverage was
better, it was less affected by sampling variability, and the weighting problem could
be solved by using the census figures as benchmarks.
5. For a recent study of cyclic fluctuations in wages in the late nineteenth century
using the Aldrich Report, see Hanes (1993).
6. For example, if one is interested in using the Weeks Report to measure
changes in the wages of common labor before 1840, there is only one usable obser-
vation for the period 1830-32.
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7. Coelho and Shepherd present no other occupation-specific estimates at the
regional level, apparently because the regional sample sizes were too small (see
Coelho and Shepherd 1976, 217, n. 31). They do, however, aggregate the entire
sample to the national level and produce money wage series for the other four
occupations (see their app. table A2).
8. If the regional price deflators are used, however, the decline is larger in the
Northeast (in percentage terms) than in the Midwest (see Coelho and Shepherd
1976, table 4, p. 213).
9. The conclusion that the real wages of engineers in the Mid-Atlantic and East
North Central regions rose in the 1850s is not very robust. In the Mid-Atlantic
case, there was no upward trend in the real wages of engineers between 1851 and
1859 and then an 11 percent increase between 1859 and 1860. In the East North
Central states, there was supposedly a 30 percent increase in the real wages of
engineers between 1851 and 1852 but no change between 1852 and 1860. Given
the small number of engineers in the Weeks Report sample for the 1850s (there
are only eighteen observations for the entire country in 1851 and nineteen in 1852),
Coelho and Shepherd's (1976, 217, n. 31) caution that the skilled occupation
groups in the Weeks data "may not be as homogenous as they appear at first
glance," and the absence of an upward trend in the 1850s, there is every reason to
be skeptical that a real wage increase occurred.
10. Using an unweighted average of the New England and Mid-Atlantic decadal
average real wages as the base, the regional gap in real wages between the East
North Central states and the Northeast was 8 percent for common laborers and
8.5 percent for engineers (calculated from Coelho and Shepherd 1976, tables 6-7,
pp. 218-19).
11. The same conclusion is affirmed in an analysis-of-variance-type regression
of the full sample (the regression controls for occupation and region) that, unfortu-
nately, does not allow skill differentials to vary across regions (i.e., interactions
between the occupation and the regional dummies) (see Coelho and Shepherd
1976, table 8, p. 220). In the case of engineers and common laborers, the Weeks
Report data suggest that skill differentials were similar in the Northeast and the
East North Central states in the 1850s but were substantially higher in the South
Central states in the late 1850s; on the basis of decadal averages, the ratio of engi-
neers' to laborers' pay was 1.69 in the 1850s in the Northeast and the East Central
states but 2.28 in the East South Central states (the figure for the East South Cen-
tral states pertains to 1857-60 only) (see Coelho and Shepherd 1976, tables 6-7,
pp. 218-19).
12. Scattered quotations are available for other types of workers, including engi-
neers, painters, and cooks (Smith 1963, 301), but Smith makes no use of these in
his analysis.
13. Smith (1963, 299, 301) noted that he was able to produce monthly wage
series for three geographic sections of the canal, but, unfortunately, the published
article reports only annual series for the entire canal.
14. If the base year is 1828 instead of 1830, real wages for both common laborers
and carpenters increased in the 1830s.
15. Lebergott (1964, 150) provided "best guesses" at real wage movements over
medium-length periods (such as 1835-50). Like Coelho and Shepherd (1976), Le-
bergott (1964, p. 150) also argued that real wages fell in the 1850s.
16. The exact nature of the disagreement between Zabler and Adams is some-
what unclear, at least as far as carpenters are concerned. The ratio of the pay of
house carpenters to that of common laborers averaged 1.25 in Philadelphia in the
1820s; as noted in the text, the corresponding ratio for the iron industry was 1.22.
17. Had the cost of living been the same in Philadelphia and rural eastern Penn-Notes to Pages 12-19 163
sylvania, a Philadelphia carpenter would have had to work only 46 percent of the
year (= 0.57/1.25), or roughly 141 days (based on a 310-day workyear). Had the
cost of living been 50 percent higher in Philadelphia, annual earnings would have
been equalized by working 68 percent of the year or an annual unemployment rate
of 32 percent.
18. Unfortunately, there is no wage quotation for common labor in 1820, but a
decline in the money wage for common labor is evident comparing the late 1810s
to the early 1820s (from $1.00 to $0.75 per day).
19. Adams also argues (1968, 413) that the use of wholesale instead of retail
prices exacerbates annual fluctuations in real wages, but he provides no evidence
supporting this position.
20. For example, the growth rate of real wages for ships' carpenters was 4.6 per-
cent per year from 1821 to 1830 but only 1.6 percent per year from 1820 to 1830.
21. However, unemployment was high in the early 1840s, consistent with Adams's
argument. Also, suppose the relative price of goods other than food and shelter
declined in the 1850s to a degree sufficient to offset the rise in the budget share for
food and shelter. Then labor welfare could be higher even though leisure fell.
22. To explain the absence of real wage growth, Adams (1986, 637) speculates
that the supply curve of labor to the farm sector in Maryland may have been close
to perfectly elastic during the period. Even if this were true, however, it does not
imply an absence of real wage growth because the supply price to agriculture
would depend (as Adams recognizes) on the opportunity cost of labor in the non-
farm sector. Thus, if real wages were rising outside Maryland agriculture, the sup-
ply price to the farm sector would also rise, assuming that the two labor markets
were integrated.
23. Taking 1820-29 as the base decade (= 100), the index number for w/p (the
real wage) for 1850-55 was 100.8.
24. Sokoloff (1986a, 23) reaches a similar conclusion; he deflates Rothenberg's
nominal wage series by the David-Solar price index, thereby producing real wage
gains from the 1820s to the 1850s.
25. The basis for this belief is unclear since, as David and Solar (1977, 61) point
out, there is "considerable obscurity surrounding] the number and distribution of
establishments" in the Massachusetts data.
26. As noted previously, Lebergott's figures are weighted averages of the state
estimates published in the 1850 and 1860 volumes; the weights are the census
counts of common laborers in each state.
27. Note that, by construction, the nominal wage appears in both the numerator
and the denominator of the David-Solar real wage index, which may dampen its
volatility. This effect is probably not large since housing costs are assumed to be
roughly 15 percent of the total household budget.
28. Hoover (1960) constructed a retail price index for the period 1851-80 using
retail prices from the Weeks Report.
29. Williamson and Lindert did not actually report a separate index for skilled
labor; rather, they report a series of skill differentials (the ratio of skilled to un-
skilled wages). The relevant series is given as "urban skilled workers" in app. D of
Williamson and Lindert (1980, 307).
30. Williamson (1975, 36) does argue, however, that nominal wage gaps between
farm and nonfarm common labor declined from the 1810s to the 1830s in Massa-
chusetts and thus that his series overstates the growth in unskilled pay prior to
1830.
31. There is some confusion between Williamson (1975) and Williamson and
Lindert (1980) over the use of Layer's series. According to the notes to table 9 in
Williamson (1975, 37), Layer's series was used for the period 1834-49, Layer being164 Notes to Pages 19-28
"preferred to Abbott . . . since the Aldrich sample is too small and inconsistent
prior to 1850." According to the text of Williamson (1975, 36) and the notes to
app. G of Williamson and Lindert (1980, 320), Layer's series was used only through
1839. In what follows, I assume that Williamson and Lindert (1980) is the authori-
tative discussion.
32. The growth rate is calculated from decadal averages of index numbers of
real wages for 1820-29 and 1850-59 (Williamson and Lindert 1980, app. G, p.
319). The ratio of the 1850s index number to the 1820s index number was 1.576
(= 89.1/56.5). Taking logarithms, and dividing by 30 (the number of years between
1825 and 1855, the midpoints of the respective decades), gives a growth rate of
the skill differential of 1.52 percent per year.
33. According to Brady, the cost of living rose by about 9 percent from 1834 to
1836, compared with an approximately 30 percent increase in the wholesale price
level (see Margo 1992, 189).
34. If one uses Brady's (1966) data, substitutes wholesale prices for coffee and
tea, and excludes clothing items with extremely steep price declines, the revised
David-Solar price index shows an increase in the cost of living between 1834 and
1836 of about 18 percent. As pointed out in chap. 3, the David-Solar real wage
index shows too high a level in the late 1830s because the numerator is based on
data from an unusually high wage location. Part of the reason, therefore, why the
David-Solar real wage index registers a decline in the early 1840s is a consequence
of the biased level in the late 1830s. However, the price deflator is also responsible,
as evinced in table 2.1 above. Price indices based on wholesale prices, such as
Williamson and Lindert's (1980) or those developed in chap. 3, register dramatic
declines in the early 1840s, in excess of declines in nominal wages, thereby caus-
ing real wages to rise. In chap. 7, I argue that nominal wages were rigid in the
short run before the Civil War, partly on the basis of the episode of the early 1840s
(see also Goldin and Margo 1992b). If retail prices declined less than wholesale
prices—and, in particular, according to the pattern revealed by the David-Solar
price index—then real wages might conceivably have fallen. However, as noted in
the text (see also chaps. 3 and 7), there are good a priori reasons to doubt that
wholesale prices, particularly for basic food items like flour, were substantially
more variable than retail prices.
35. Weiss's (1992, 26) variant A estimate of per capita income grows at an aver-
age annual rate of 1.21 percent per year between 1820 and 1860. Using Weiss's
figures on the total labor force, the aggregate labor force participation rate in-
creased from 0.328 in 1820 to 0.358 in 1860, or an average annual rate of growth
of 0.22 percent per year. Thus, output per worker grew at 0.99 percent per year,
considerably slower than the growth rates implied by the real wage series.
36. For an excellent general history of the Quartermaster's Department, see
Risch (1962).
37. The ability of post quartermasters to hire civilians varied over time. Nor-
mally, it would appear, the hiring of civilians had to be approved at some level,
even if directly authorized by the post's commanding officer. General Order no.
43, issued in 1851, made obtaining such authority much more difficult; it forbade
the hiring of civilians for any purpose except as authorized by army division head-
quarters (Prucha 1953, 168). Although the number of civilians hired in the 1850s
clearly fell in certain regions (see, e.g., table 2.2 below in the case of forts in the
South Atlantic region), it did not in others.
38. By gaps, I mean that not every type of worker (e.g., teamsters) was hired at
every post in every month. The idiosyncratic nature of the army's demand for
civilian labor (e.g., no carpenter could be found among the troops) is the most
likely explanation for the gaps, although it is certainly possible that some civilians
were hired but that no administrative record survives.Notes to Pages 28-37 165
39. For an exhaustive survey of the available records, see Heppner and John
(1968).
40. Workers at arsenals were frequently paid by the piece, and output seems to
have been recorded on a daily basis. Hence, the records are voluminous and dif-
ficult to use. The naval records are similar to the Reports but tend to be more volu-
minous, and the locations tend to more or less duplicate those from the Reports.
41. Payrolls were also collected from forts in Florida between 1835 and 1842,
forts in Texas during the Mexican War, and forts in the Far West. With the excep-
tion of forts in California (see chap. 6), data from these forts are not used in this
book.
42. The extract from the full sample used in chap. 3 differs in that certain forts
and wage outliers are excluded and attention restricted to particular occupation
groups, but the broad distributional patterns are the same.
43. This number, however, overstates the amount of independent information in
the sample because some workers were hired for longer periods of time than a
month and therefore appear more than once in the sample.
44. The temporal detail in the table understates the degree to which certain time
periods are under- or overrepresented; when the data are disaggregated by year,
some years are severely underrepresented. As a result, it is necessary in some cases
to pool data across years, which means that some of the resulting wage estimates
must be interpolated (see chap. 3).
45. The unusually large number of observations for Kansas pertains only to
the 1850s.
46. For example, Smith (1963) provided series for only common laborers, car-
penters, masons, and teamworkers.
47. Of free males aged fifteen and over reporting nonfarm occupations in the
1850 census, fully 43.2 percent were either carpenters, clerks, laborers, masons
and plasters, painters and glaziers, or teamsters (computed from DeBow 1854,
126-28).
48. For an analysis of the data on agricultural yields in 1860, see Schaefer (1983).
49. The specific instructions for collecting the wage data stated nothing more
than that "the information called for in the six columns is so simple and so plainly
set forth in the headings that it is deemed unnecessary to add thereto" (DeBow
1853, xxv).
50. Such activities can be inferred from the occupation information in the Re-
ports. For example, a white-collar worker might be designated as a "clerk in the
quartermaster's department" or an "assistant to quartermaster"; since the post
quartermasters were involved in record keeping and so forth, it seems reasonable
to infer that their civilian employees assisted them in such activities.
51. It is clear that post quartermasters had to compete with private-sector em-
ployers when they attempted to hire civilians (see, e.g., Prucha 1953, 166). Ruhlen
(1964, 19) cites a report describing the construction of an early Nevada fort: "At
the time the post was located a great competition for mechanics, materials, &c
was created by the settlement and building of the several cities of Carson, Silver,
and Virginia."
Chapter 3
1. For example, a tight specification would allow wages to vary over time ac-
cording to a linear time trend rather than dummy variables for each year (see the
text). The coefficient of the time trend is an estimate of the average annual rate of
growth. This growth rate may be estimated accurately but at the cost of ignoring
annual movements in wages around the trend.166 Notes to Pages 37-44
2. It is important to note that this is a pooled time-series cross-sectional regres-
sion as opposed to a panel regression. In a panel setup, observations—or, rather,
individuals—would be followed through time. To follow individuals through time,
it would be necessary to link them across years using some identifying feature,
such as a name. Although names were sometimes included on the payrolls, the
reporting of names was irregular enough (especially for common laborers) that
panel estimation proved infeasible.
3. In logs, the value of X* in period y is X*$ + hp while the value in period k is
X*$ + bk. Thus, the relative value of the bundle in the two periods is (X*fJ + 8,)
- (X*$ + 8J = bj - hk, which does not depend on A'or p, as stated in the text.
4. Twenty-six days is the standard figure used in such conversions (see Lebergott
1964, 245).
5. Compared with modern-day wage regressions, the list of X variables is very
small; in particular, it does not control for work experience, which, on the basis of
modern evidence, might be expected to have an effect on wages. The assumption
in constructing the wage series is that the distribution of unobserved characteristics
does not vary over time. If it does—e.g., if workers at the forts were, on average,
more experienced in the 1850s than in the 1820s and wages were a positive function
of experience—then the growth rates of the series would be biased upward. To get
at this issue, it would be necessary to trace observations through time or else link
the payrolls to another source that would provide proxies for unobserved charac-
teristics, such as the manuscript Censuses of Population of 1850 or 1860. However,
any such linked sample would be small in size and could not be used to construct
annual wage series.
6. Regressions for the South were also estimated excluding slaves; however, to
produce nominal wage series from these regressions requires much more interpola-
tion (see the text regarding the procedure to produce the nominal wage series)
than if slaves are included. Because almost all slave artisans at South Central forts
were employed in the 1830s, it was not possible to allow the coefficient of slave
status in this regression to vary across decades.
7. Fishback and Kantor estimate the wage premium for unemployment risk in
a hedonic regression. Their regression also includes dummy variables for pay peri-
ods (whether the worker was paid weekly or monthly). As argued in the text (see
also Fishback and Kantor 1992, 832), the coefficients on these dummy variables
also capture unemployment risk. Fishback and Kantor's conclusion, however, that
workers were less than fully compensated for unemployment risk is based on co-
efficients of days lost in the hedonic regression, controlling for the pay period; thus,
they may be underestimating the degree to which workers were compensated for
unemployment risk.
8. Lebergott (1964, 245-50) provides evidence on the day wage premium for a
variety of occupations. In agriculture, the premium stood at about 46 percent in
1869, drifting down to 29 percent at the turn of the century. In Pennsylvania iron-
works in the early 1830s, twenty-six times the day wage was 36 percent higher than
the average monthly wage. Labor contracts for seamen provide some of the most
revealing evidence; Lebergott shows that monthly wages were significantly lower
on longer-distance voyages—until the replacement of steam for sail, which cut the
length of voyages significantly.
9. In such cases, rations were valued at $0.12 or $0.20, depending on internal
evidence in the reports (see Margo and Villaflor 1987, 878).
10. Alternatively, slaves may have been more costly to supervise than free labor
and may also have been less likely to bring tools to the job, and both these factors
would be reflected in a lower wage.
11. Choosing an X* is not necessary if one wishes merely to calculate a nominalNotes to Pages 45-53 167
wage index; such an index can be computed directly from the coefficients of the
time-period dummies because the dependent variable is measured in logarithms
(see Margo 1992). However, if one wishes to produce a nominal wage series (i.e.,
dollar values), it is necessary to choose a value of X*.
12. The fort location weights are similar to those in Margo (1992).
13. It is worth noting that the nominal wage indices can be computed from the
nominal wage series simply by dividing each wage by the appropriate 1850 bench-
mark.
14. These data can be found in "Naval Hospital Payrolls," Bureau of Yards and
Docks, Record Group 71, National Archives. It is important to note that these
workers were building hospitals and other buildings at the yard, not ships (ship
carpenters earned a premium above ordinary carpenters).
15. The coefficient estimates are as follows: 1835: skilled, -0.236; 1836: skilled,
-0.167; unskilled, -0.206; 1837: skilled, -0.218.
16. If Pittsburgh observations are allocated to the Midwest, the nominal wages
of white-collar workers in the Midwest grew at an average annual rate of 1.77
percent (based on the decadal averages for the 1820s and 1850s), compared with
1.24 percent per year if Pittsburgh observations are allocated to the Northeast. If
the Pittsburgh observations are excluded from the Northeast, the nominal wages
of white-collar workers in the Northeast increase at an average annual rate of 1.18
percent per year (based on the decadal averages for the 1820s and 1850s), com-
pared with an average annual rate of 1.43 percent per year if Pittsburgh observa-
tions are included in the Northeastern samples. The upshot is that white-collar
wages in Pittsburgh increased comparatively rapidly (relative to other locations in
the Northeast) and thus that their inclusion (exclusion) raises (lowers) the regional
growth rate.
17. For details on the construction of the price indices for 1821-56, see the ap-
pendix to Goldin and Margo (1992b). Extending the original Goldin-Margo price
indices to 1860 followed the procedures described in the Goldin and Margo paper.
Some slight additional modifications were made to trend in the price indices for
the 1850s, making use of the 1850 and 1860 census data on the weekly cost of board.
18. In this respect, they are similar to the price deflators employed in various
studies of antebellum real wages, such as Williamson and Lindert (1980; see also
chap. 2 below).
19. There is also the problem of properly pricing the services provided by goods
that are affected by technological progress, a problem that I do not address. Nord-
haus (1997) argues that conventional real wage series, such as those developed in
this book, systematically understate growth rates in living standards by failing to
account for the value of such services properly.
20. Lebergott (1964, 548) reported price index numbers for 1830, 1840, 1850,
and 1860. I substituted the good-specific retail price change between 1830 and
1860 for the decadal average of the respective subindex in my Northeastern price
deflator. Thus, e.g., Lebergott's calculation shows a decline in the retail price of
textiles of 26 percent (from an index number of 100 in 1830 to an index number
of 74 in 1860), whereas the cotton subindex of my price deflator declines by 12.5
percent from the 1830s to the 1850s. I do not substitute Lebergott's price index
for coffee since this shows a rise over the period, compared to a decline in the
wholesale price. It is important to note that, had I averaged Lebergott's figures
between successive census years (e.g., 1830 and 1840) to produce decadal mid-
points and used the midpoints instead to infer the bias, the bias would have been
smaller.
21. As noted in chap. 2, the Hoover housing price index is problematic because
it is based on company housing (see Lebergott 1964).168 Notes to Pages 77-80
Chapter 4
1. The proof is very simple. Suppose that aggregate labor supply is fixed at L.
Efficiency requires that production be at a point on the production possibilities
frontier. In the two-sector model in the text, the value of output is
pF(LA, T)+ G(L- LA, K),
where F is a production function for agriculture, G is a production function for
nonagricultural output, T (land) and K (capital) are specific (fixed) factors, and p
is the relative price of farm output. V is maximized when
or when VMPF = VMPG. Note that this formulation assumes that both economic
activities (can) take place at the same time, with the result that the opportunity
cost of labor in one sector (e.g., agriculture) is the value of the marginal product
in the other sector. Suppose, instead, that production were seasonal, specifically,
that the marginal product of labor in sector / was zero for some portion of the
relevant time period (e.g., a year). Seasonal cycles can be said to mesh perfectly
if, when the marginal product in sector i is zero, the marginal product in sector j
is positive (and vice versa). With perfect seasonal cycles, labor is no longer mobile
between the two sectors; rather, it moves between, say, nonparticipation (leisure)
and one or the other sector, depending on the time of year. While seasonality was
certainly important during the antebellum period and there was some meshing of
the agricultural and nonagricultural cycles (see, e.g., Earle 1992; Engerman and
Goldin 1993), it would be incorrect to claim that it was perfect, in the sense dis-
cussed above.
2. Implicit in the model is the assumption that the demand for both goods is
perfectly elastic—i.e., pnflpf if = farm, nf = nonfarm) is a constant. If, instead,
the relative demand for nonfarm goods were an inverse function of the relative
price, an improvement in technology could drive down the value of the marginal
product in the nonfarm sector, and labor would migrate into the farm sector.
3. In the so-called Harris-Todaro model, the resulting wage difference between
the formal and the informal sectors adjusts to compensate workers for the cost of
unemployment (see Williamson 1991).
4. Weiss's (1992, 24-25) major revisions for the early decades of the century
involve the reallocation of slave labor (attributed by Lebergott to agriculture) to
the nonfarm sector, while his revisions at midcentury involve the reallocation of
substantial numbers of common laborers to farming. Because the revisions to the
early years have more of an effect on the South than on the North, while his revi-
sions for midcentury are more uniform in their geographic effect, Weiss's figures
imply a slower pace of industrialization outside the South than previously thought.
5. Or, indeed, at all. According to Field (1978), the puzzle is why industrializa-
tion would take hold in such a land-abundant economy as the United States.
6. The labor that was vented off the farm was, according to Field (see also Gol-
din and Sokoloff 1984), children and, especially, young women. Migration to the
frontier was difficult and costly for adult males, all the more so for young women
(but, for evidence that hired hands who were young might also migrate long dis-
tances on their own in search of work, see Schob 1975). Young women who might
work as domestics on farms were forced to seek work in manufacturing. A serious
problem for Field's argument, however, is the fact that industrialization apparently
raised the earnings of young women relative to those of adult males, while theNotes to Pages 81-84 169
opposite would have been true if Field's model were correct (see Goldin and Soko-
loff 1984).
7. For example, Simkovich (1993) explicitly assumes the absence of wage gaps
in his analysis of Field's argument (see, e.g., his fig. 3).
8. In this respect, far better data are available for studying postbellum wage
gaps (see, e.g., Hatton and Williamson 1991). Lebergott (1964) produced extensive
estimates of farm, common, and manufacturing wages for the antebellum period,
but he did not use them for the purpose of estimating wage gaps.
9. All Bidwell and Falconer's wage comparisons refer to farm labor paid by the
month or by the day and "mechanics" paid by the day, even though mechanics
were certainly skilled laborers by the standards of the day.
10. The nonfarm wage series used to construct the Vermont wage ratio was
drawn from the Aldrich Report of the 1890 census and does not appear to be
specific to Vermont (see the notes to Williamson and Lindert 1980, table E, p.
313), although it is specific to the Northeast. Since Vermont farm wages were
relatively low by Northeastern standards, particularly in the 1830s (see Lebergott
1964, 539), it is likely that Williamson and Lindert's estimates of the Vermont wage
gap are biased upward.
11. Williamson and Lindert (1980, 72 and app. E) claim that their Massachusetts
common wage pertains to urban labor, but nowhere does Wright (1889) give any
information about the geographic location of the common laborers whose wage
rates he collected for his sample.
12. Later in the chapter, however, I show that Williamson and Lindert's analysis
of the published 1850 data was faulty and that their conclusion that (aggregate)
nominal wage gaps "were trivial" cannot be sustained.
13. Comparing the wages of farmhands with those of carpenters or mechanics
(a la Bidwell and Falconer 1925) would confuse a true wage gap with one produced
by differences in human capital. Ideally, we would have a sample of individuals
employed in both sectors and use hedonic regression to control for worker charac-
teristics, but such samples are not available for the antebellum period. For an ex-
ample of such a study, see Hatton and Williamson (1991).
14. The harvest was an apparent exception. Harvest labor was paid a wage pre-
mium, evidently because the supply of labor to the farm sector during the harvest
was less than perfectly elastic (see Schob 1975; and Rothenberg 1992). The farm
wage data analyzed here refer to monthly labor, whereas harvest labor was typi-
cally hired by the day or the task (Schob 1975).
15. Twenty-six days per month is the standard figure assumed for full-time work
during the antebellum period (see Schob 1975; or Lebergott 1964).
16. Ideally, I would use county-level estimates of the number of hired hands and
(unskilled) nonfarm laborers, but these are simply not available. It is debatable
whether slaves should be excluded from the weighting scheme since slave labor
was hired out into nonfarm (or even farm) tasks (see Fogel and Engerman 1974).
To test the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of slave labor, I recomputed
the Southern sample averages (the adjusted row) for 1850, excluding slave labor as
follows. First, slaves were excluded from the count of the farm labor force of each
state (North Carolina, Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee), as given by Weiss
(1992, 53). Next, I estimated the nonfarm slave labor force, assuming that the
agricultural slave labor force was 0.74 times the total slave labor force (see Weiss
1992, 54). Finally, using Weiss's (1992,37) estimates of the total labor force, the free
nonfarm labor force was computed for each state. Using these weights, the ad-
justed farm wage was $14.50 and the adjusted nonfarm wage $16.46 for the South-
ern sample in 1850, very similar to the figures reported in table 4.1 below.170 Notes to Pages 84-91
17. For example, the use of manufacturing labor in place of my estimate of
nonfarm labor would not change the substantive results.
18. The use of 0 may be more appropriate since it gives more weight to counties
with relatively more employment in the nonfarm sector, which was expanding over
time in settled areas (but see n. 16 above).
19. Weights for arbitrarily defined local economies (e.g., ones that cut across
county or state boundaries) would require computations based on the manuscript
Censuses of Agriculture and Manufacturing, computations that, while technically
feasible, are well beyond the scope of this chapter. It should be noted that the use
of census political units (e.g., counties, states, census regions) in the analysis of
market integration has a long history in the literature (see also chap. 5). For ex-
ample, state per capita income data have formed the basis of numerous studies of
labor market integration, such as Williamson and Lindert (1980).
20. The Northern aggregate gaps are larger than the state-specific gaps because
of weighting; in computing the mean farm wage, more weight is given (via the
distribution of improved acres) to the frontier states, where the farm wage was
relatively low compared with, say, Massachusetts.
21. However, it is quite likely that nonfarm labor within counties was concen-
trated in towns or cities, where the cost of living was higher than in rural areas.
As I later demonstrate, the aggregate wage gap declines once cost-of-living differ-
ences are taken into account. I cannot replicate this analysis, however, within
counties because I lack suitable sector weights (e.g., improved acres) at the minor
civil division (MCD) level. Thus, use of the (3 weights probably overstates the true
within-county gap.
22. This regression is estimated at the minor civil division level, pooling the data
across states and over time (seventy-nine MCDs reported a monthly common wage
instead of a daily wage). The dependent variable is the log of the common wage;
state dummies, a dummy for 1860, and a dummy for the misreported observations
are the independent variables. It would be desirable to estimate a similar regression
for farm labor, but the number of misreported observations on the farm wage was
judged to be too small (ten observations) to obtain a reliable estimate.
23. The adjustment factor shifts the distribution of farm wages closer to the
distribution of nonfarm wages, thereby closing the wage gap, on average (and
throughout the distribution). Since the adjustment factor is constant, it does not
compress either distribution, as I suspect county-specific adjustment factors would.
24. Studies of labor market integration have frequently had to rely on food
prices to adjust for geographic differences in the cost of living (see, e.g., Rosen-
bloom 1990; and chap. 5 below).
25. Defining an urban county as one that had at least one urban area with popu-
lation greater than ten thousand, the cost of board was higher, on average, in such
counties by 34 percent in 1850 and 25 percent in 1860 (these estimates were derived
from regressions of the log of the weekly cost of board on the urban dummy, also
including state dummies).
26. Williamson and Lindert's estimates compare the daily wage of farm labor
with board and the daily wage of common labor with board. Williamson and Lind-
ert (1980, 31) assert that, because both wages include board, "cost of living differ-
ences are unlikely to matter much." However, in equilibrium, the difference be-
tween the daily wage with and without board should approximate the value of
board.
27. Williamson and Lindert's estimates of daily wages of common and farm
labor at the regional level and for various states are taken directly from Lebergott
(1964), who produced them from the average wages reported in the 1850 census.
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case of the common laborer, the weight is Lebergott's estimates of the number of
nonfarm laborers; in the case of the farm wage, the weight is Lebergott's estimate
of the number of free white farmers.
28. Williamson and Lindert converted monthly farm wages to daily farm wages
using an adjustment factor derived from table A-30 in Lebergott (1964, 546). Leb-
ergott's table gives estimates of monthly and daily wages with board, both purport-
edly for farm labor, in 1832. Williamson and Lindert's adjustment factor is simply
the ratio of the monthly to the daily wage. But Lebergott's text (pp. 258, 267-68),
table A-23 (p. 539), and table A-25 (p. 541) make it clear that the monthly wage in
his table A-30 refers to farm labor and the daily wage to common labor. As Leber-
gott (p. 267) notes, the ratio of the day wage of common labor to the monthly
wage of farm labor in 1832 was approximately the same as the ratio prevailing
in 1850.
29. I assume that the average female wage was 55 percent of the average male
wage; this ratio is derived from fig. 3.1 in Goldin (1990, 62). Assuming the same
female-male wage ratio for each county, I derive an estimate of the male wage on
the assumption that wm is a weighted average of the male and the female wage, the
weight being the proportion female.
30. This procedure was used for each state except Tennessee, where it resulted
in implausible nonfarm weights. In the case of Tennessee, the common wage was
aggregated using census figures on the manufacturing labor force.
Chapter 5
1. Coelho and Shepherd's (1976) regional series begin in the 1850s. On capital
market integration before the Civil War see Bodenhora and Rockoff (1992).
2. Per capita incomes in the East South Central region, however, were nearly
twice as high as in the South Atlantic or West South Central regions.
3. A related explanation involves liberal policies toward the disposal of public
land, which effectively subsidized western movement (see, e.g., Fogel and Rutner
1972; Temin 1969; or Lebergott 1985).
4. On the other hand, the implicit assumption is that the "weekly cost of board
to laboring men"—the census definition of the concept—meant the same thing to
all respondents; i.e., the quantity of food purchased by the weekly expenditure was
(approximately) the same in all parts of the country. If board meant much fancier
meals in, say, New York City than in rural Iowa, this assumption would be false.
5. The weekly cost of board divided by the weekly wage (without board) is an
estimate of the budget share for food. If the weekly wage for common and farm
labor is estimated by multiplying the daily wage without board by six days per
week (the daily wage for farm labor is the monthly wage plus the [imputed] value
of board divided by twenty-six days of work), the mean value of the budget share
is 0.39, or 39 percent. This might seem low, but it must be remembered that this
is an estimate for a single male, without dependents, working full-time. Allowances
for unemployment and dependents would push the budget share up into the range
observed for working-class households during the period.
6. Note that board is used in this manner only for the benchmark (i.e., 1850)
deflator. Changes in the relative price indices over time also reflect changes in non-
food prices because nonfood prices are included in the indices (see chap. 3 below;
and Goldin and Margo 1992a).
7. To derive the estimate of the relative (Midwest-Northeast) cost of living in
1851, I multiply the benchmark for 1850 (= 0.77) by the ratio of the Midwest-
Northeastern price deflators for 1851.172 Notes to Pages 103-12
8.1 use farmers as well as laborers because chap. 5 found that the wages of farm
and common laborers were similar. The implicit assumption is that the ratio of
farm laborers to total farmers in each region were similar.
9. The timing of the convergence in relative wages in the North contrasts some-
what with Ross's (1985, 43) assertion that migration "in the late 1820s and 1830s
brought the artificially high wages of the labor scarce frontier.. . more in line with
lower eastern wage levels."
10. By other forces, I mean the effects of factor price equalization. It is well
known that falling costs of internal transport produced convergence in output
prices between the Midwest and the Northeast (Berry 1943), and it is plausible to
argue that factor price equalization occurred in response to output price conver-
gence (O'Rourke and Williamson 1994; Slaughter 1995).
11. Specifically, the aggregate North-South gap (in logs) was -0.027 for 1821—
30, 0.103 for 1831-40, 0.175 for 1841-50, and 0.076 for 1851-60.
12. In choosing the North over the South, unskilled immigrants were, according
to my findings, migrating to those places where real wages were higher on average.
Skilled immigrants in the 1840s, however, would have enjoyed higher real wages
in the South (see table 5.3) and, thus, must have avoided the South for other rea-
sons (e.g., slavery or the climate).
13. Booming conditions in the cotton market may also explain some of the nar-
rowing of the North-South wage gap in the 1850s (see Fogel 1989).
14. That is, 0.045 = [exp(0.0152 - 0.0141) X 40] - 1. For artisans redistribution
added 3.6 percent over four decades, for common laborers 2.8 percent.
15. An alternative approach to measuring the effect of migration on aggregate
wage growth is to allow the regional occupation shares to change but to fix the
wage gaps at their initial level. For the purpose of illustration, I fix the wage gaps
at their average levels for the period 1825-30. Recomputing the aggregate series
under this assumption, and then reestimating the trend growth rates as in table 5.5
(In w = a + (3T), the resulting P's are 0.00174 for common laborers, 0.00226 for
artisans, and 0.00183 for white-collar workers. These rates imply much larger
effects of migration; e.g., migration raised the growth rate of common wages by
16.7 percent (= 0.00174/0.0104). The larger effects result because the alternative
approach does not permit wage convergence to occur as a consequence of inter-
nal migration.
16. If wlp is computed relative to the state average and all variables are in logs,
this is equivalent to adding terms like fiwlp^ + wlp^m for each state to the right-
hand side of the regression, where u, = the state average. Since these terms are the
same for all counties in a state, an equivalent procedure is to include a full set of
state dummies.
17. The growth rate of population is log (population 1860/population 1850). The
change in urbanization is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the county
had an urban area of population ten thousand or more in 1860 but not in 1850.
18. Perhaps the best way to control for amenities or disamenities would be
through county fixed effects (dummy variables), but this would require additional
years of data. On the other hand, offsetting the bias in p toward zero is a bias
toward — 1 because of measurement error in the real wage. On the assumption
that the errors in measurement are concentrated in the tails of the distribution,
the effects on the estimate of (3 can be gauged by trimming the data, i.e., excluding
observations with high or low values of ln(w/6)lg5O. For example, if the regression
for common/farm labor is subjected to a 10 percent trim (the bottom and top 10
percent of observations are excluded on the basis of their values of ln[w/6]1850), the
estimate of p = 0.779, similar to the estimate for the full sample.
19. According to the regression coefficient, about 80 percent of the relative wageNotes to Pages 113-25 173
gap for a typical county was eliminated within a decade. This is much faster than,
e.g., the speed at which the Midwest-Northeast wage gap was eliminated over the
period 1820-60 (see table 5.2).
20. The weight 7y. = Sj/s, where Sj is Weiss's estimate of the total labor force
(Weiss 1992, 37) less his estimate of the number of slaves in the farm labor force
(Weiss 1992, 53). This overstates the free labor force in the South because some
slaves were engaged in nonagricultural pursuits. However, experiments with
different weights that also netted out estimates of nonagricultural slaves produced
virtually identical deflators.
21. The regional adjustment factor is the unweighted average of the ratio (X
hjkbjk)lbj for the two states in each region in the eight-state sample (chap. 2), where
k indexes counties, bjk is the weekly cost of board at the county level (from the
manuscript census returns), and hjk is the county's share of the state population.
The adjustment factors differ from unity, indicating that, properly weighted, the
average cost of board within states differed from the state averages published in
the 1850 census.
Chapter 6
1. The California Gold Rush was not the only gold rush of the nineteenth cen-
tury, but it was certainly the most famous. For a good general history of nine-
teenth-century gold rushes, see Marks (1994).
2. The Sutter's Mill discovery was actually not the first in California. Small
amounts of gold were found in southern California near Los Angeles in 1842.
The gold was quickly recovered by experienced Mexican miners, and a search for
additional gold ensued, but none was found (Lavender 1976, 3).
3. According to Wright (1940, 342), forty-two thousand migrants are estimated
to have arrived overland, while another thirty-nine thousand arrived by ship at
San Francisco. In 1850, fifty-five thousand are alleged to have arrived overland,
thirty-six thousand by sea. However, approximately twenty-seven thousand de-
parted by sea in 1850 (the number departing in 1849 is unknown); whether they
left permanently is not known. The estimates of arrivals by land derive primarily
from newspaper reports and must be regarded as extremely rough. Records of ship
arrivals were kept at the San Francisco customhouse and are presumably more ac-
curate.
4. The share of miners per person in 1850 is biased upward because of damage
to the manuscript census returns from a few nonmining areas, including San Fran-
cisco. However, adding the population counts from the 1852 state census to the
denominator would still produce a substantial decline in miners per capita between
1850 and 1860.
5. The 1850 population figure is biased downward because of fire damage to the
census manuscripts for San Francisco and other counties.
6. Evidently, sending clothes to Hawaii for cleaning (presumably to be picked
up on the miner's next trip to San Francisco) could be cheaper than buying a new
shirt or trousers or paying inflated prices for cleaning in San Francisco. Caughey
(1948, 35) notes that the price of a coarse shirt in 1849 was $16.00, apparently
high enough to make the cost of transporting dirty shirts to Hawaii for washing
economically feasible.
7. A Dutch disease model is used to study the effects of supply-side shocks,
usually the discovery of natural resources, on other sectors of an economy (e.g.,
manufacturing) (see Corden and Neary 1982). The name Dutch disease comes
from the fact that the rise in the price of oil in the early 1970s apparently caused174 Notes to Pages 125-29
resources to flow into oil production in countries like the Netherlands, at the ex-
pense of manufacturing.
8. By assuming equal endowment shares, I am relegating property rights issues
(who owns the gold) to the background. For an analysis of property rights issues,
see Umbreck (1977) and Clay and Wright (1998).
9. An alternative, essentially equivalent model divides the population of a gold
rush economy into three groups: capitalists (owners of AT), workers, and mine own-
ers (owners of ore). The capitalists and mine owners hire labor in a competitive
market. Aggregate demands for X and Z are then the sum of the group-specific
demands (the incomes of the capitalists and mine owners are the rents accruing to
A"and O). There will be a balanced trade condition similar to the budget constraint
in the text.




pxX + pzZ = PxF(Lx, K) + g(L - LJS,
where JF is the production function for X, AT is capital, and 5 is the endowment of
gold ore. The first-order conditions are
UJU: = pjpz,
PJL = s's.
11. For example, h = p*p\
 p, where (3 is the share of income devoted to X (recall
that the price deflators developed in chap. 3 take this form).
12. The opposite would be true if demand for labor in the local sector fell, but
this cannot happen if X is a normal good.
13. Capital might also be attracted if, in the new equilibrium, Lx is higher than
initially.
14. That is, with specialization, there would be a marginal worker who, in the
initial equilibrium, would be indifferent between harvesting gold and producing
the local good.
15. Alternatively, individuals might believe (erroneously) that the gold rush will
last forever and then be surprised by its end.
16. By convex adjustment costs, I mean that, at any time t, the marginal cost of
moving L* units of labor into the gold rush economy is increasing in L*. Convex
adjustment costs are frequently analyzed in dynamic models of labor demand (see,
e.g., Hamermesh 1993; Carrington 1996).
17. By long-run equilibrium value, I mean the value of w in the absence of adjust-
ment costs. With adjustment costs, there is no constant equilibrium value of w for
all dates t in the interval (t, t').
18. That is, there is option value to waiting if the returns to migration are uncer-
tain (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994). The transport costs of migration are sunk be-
cause the good (transportation) is perishable; however, for evidence that some mi-
grants took goods with them to sell in the gold fields, which would be a way of
recouping some of the sunk costs, see Caughey (1948, 98).
19. Such a belief would be rational if, as was the case in California, property
rights to the gold were not established ex ante. In other words, if property rights
had been established, it is plausible that some migration would have been delayed,
producing a less elastic labor supply response. I am grateful to Lee Alston for
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20. See also Fraser (1983), who argues that the introduction of money by army
quartermasters into the local indigenous economies of the Southwest had effects
on local prices.
21. In particular, the time series are too short to distinguish between the effects
of the real shock—the discovery of gold—on wages and any effects of the increase
in the money stock.
22. Gerber (1997) has recently constructed annual nominal and real wage indi-
ces for California during the Gold Rush using such anecdotal evidence. Gerber's
indices differ significantly in terms of the nature of the data and the manner of
construction from those presented in this chapter. In particular, Gerber presents
a single wage index meant to capture the average nominal daily wage covering a
variety of occupations. Each occupation is weighted according to occupation
shares derived from the 1850 census. However, the number of occupations included
in the average differs from year to year (e.g., two in 1848, fifteen in 1853). Thus,
Gerber's index is not a true fixed-weight index (in a true fixed-weight index, the
same occupations would be represented every year); fluctuations in the average
from year to year are almost certainly introduced when new occupations are
added, not a desirable characteristic for a wage index. Gerber produces his real
labor cost series by dividing the nominal wage index by Berry's overall wholesale
price index. Although year-to-year movements in Berry's overall index and the
price deflator are similar, the downward trend in prices from 1847 to 1860 is more
pronounced in Berry's overall price index. The overall index includes noncon-
sumption goods (unlike the price deflator developed in this chapter), and thus
its use as a price deflator to produce a real wage series is questionable—hence,
presumably, Gerber's term real labor cost.
Prior to 1850, Gerber's data derive principally from the personal correspon-
dence of miners and travel accounts. The 1850 estimate is based on the federal
census, while those for 1851-60 derive from scattered figures reported in the news-
papers Aha California and San Francisco Prices Current. Wage quotations from
southern California were excluded from Gerber's index on the grounds that wages
were lower in the southern part of the state, implying that "the state was not a
well-integrated economic region" (Gerber 1997, 5). While my regressions also re-
veal that wages were lower in southern California, the payrolls themselves clearly
demonstrate that labor could still command impressive pay by national standards,
such as the herdsmen employed at the fort at San Diego who earned $100 per
month in 1850, a figure far in excess of wages for similar work elsewhere in the
United States. This suggests that southern California locations were not immune
to the wage effects of the rush (and, therefore, should not be excluded from the
sample on a priori grounds). The number of wage quotations in Gerber's sample
is extremely small—e.g., the 1847 estimate was apparently based on only two wage
quotations, that for 1848 on six (Gerber 1997, 24).
It is difficult to determine the accuracy of wage quotations contained in letters
and other testimony of migrants (or even in newspapers) in the light of the known
hyperbole characteristic of accounts of the early years of the rush. A large sample
of wage observations from payroll records, such as those used in this chapter,
would seem clearly preferable for constructing wage indices because such data re-
cord actual wage payments, unlike the quotations evidently underlying Gerber's
index.
In any event, comparisons of the nominal and real wage series presented here
with those by Gerber are difficult to make because of the very different methods
of construction. However, the basic findings are very similar. Gerber finds that real
wages peaked in 1849; my real wage series for common laborers and artisans (the
occupations examined by Gerber) also peak in 1849. Gerber also finds, as do I,176 Notes to Pages 131-34
that the Gold Rush permanently raised real wages in California (according to his
real labor cost index, real wages were 4.9 times higher in 1860 than in 1847) and
that the wage effects of the rush were largely over by the mid-1850s. Using my
estimates of labor supply (see app. 6B), Gerber's wage series also imply an inelastic
supply of labor into California in the late 1840s (e = 0.15 from 1847 to 1848,
d[ln L] is my estimate of the change in labor supply from 1847-February 1848 to
March-December 1848, and d[\n w] is the change in Gerber's [1997, 17] index of
real labor cost from 1847 to 1848), followed by a flattening (e.g., e = 1.85 from
1847 to 1852).
23. For example, common laborers hired at army installations in the San Fran-
cisco Bay area could command up to $120-5150 per month in 1850 and $5.00-
$6.00 per day, while some carpenters were paid up to $12.00 per day (although
most were paid less, $10.00 per day). According to the manuscript Census of Social
Statistics for San Francisco, day laborers earned $6.00 per day and carpenters
$9.42 (quoted in Gerber 1997, 5). San Francisco wages were higher than the aver-
ages estimated for the entire state, which indicates the importance of having a large
sample covering a variety of locations rather than a few isolated locations that
may or may not be representative of the average.
24. Hispanic status is inferred from name or from ancillary remarks in the pay-
rolls; as noted in chap. 2, the reporting of names in the payrolls is haphazard,
particularly at larger forts.
25. Coman (1912, 2:317) also suggests that nominal wages of carpenters fell by
1853, but, unfortunately, she provides no source citations for her wage quotations.
26. To construct the deflator, I used Berry's annual price indices (budget shares
in parentheses) for candles (0.098), coffee (0.075), flour (0.150), hams (0.189), rai-
sins (0.033), rice (0.003), cotton sheeting (0.260), sugar (0.085), tobacco (0.025),
and butter (0.133). The price deflator is a geometric weighted average of the
commodity-specific indices, with weights equaled to the budget shares, as above.
27. The drop in prices in 1848 may reflect the sudden exodus of population from
San Francisco for the gold fields. According to Coman (1912, 2:257), real estate
prices fell sharply in 1848 in the immediate aftermath of the exodus, and the price
deflator suggests that the same may have been true of other prices.
28. Berry drew his price quotations from newspapers, and therefore the bulk of
the quotations pertain to urban prices (chiefly, San Francisco). Since most goods
were transported to the camps from San Francisco (or Sacramento), retail prices
at the camps would include transport costs as well as other markups (Coman 1912,
2:271). However, because of the dependence on urban areas for supply, there is no
reason to believe that prices at the mining camps followed a vastly different annual
pattern than that indicated by Berry's data.
29. The growth rate of real wages for common labor in California over the pe-
riod from 1847-February 1848 to 1860 was 10.1 percent per year, compared with
1.9 percent per year for 1847-60, as computed from my aggregate national real
wage series for common labor (see chap. 5).
30. Using the state-level figures on the weekly cost of board (from Kennedy
1864, 512) and on the daily wages of common laborers without board (from Leber-
gott 1964, 541), I compute
r = (wjbc)/(wjbn)
for 1860, where w is the wage, b is the weekly cost of board, c refers to California,
and n refers to the rest of the United States (excluding the West): r = 0.99 (note
that r is the same measure of real wages as used in chap. 5). Taken at face value,
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on the eve of the Civil War were virtually identical to real wages elsewhere. Similar
results were found for male manufacturing workers in 1879 by Rosenbloom (1996,
644); not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did a sizable real
wage gap in favor of the West open up (Rosenbloom 1996).
31. As noted in sec. 6.1, East Coast ships did occasionally trade manufactured
goods for furs in pre-Gold Rush California, but their small numbers and infre-
quent stops make it difficult to maintain in any meaningful sense that pre-Gold
Rush California was integrated into the American economy (see Coman 1912,
1:165).
32. For example, using the real wage series for common labor for California, the
national aggregate series in chap. 5, and the observation (see n. 30 above) that real
wages of common labor in California in 1860 were essentially the same as in the
rest of the country, the average real wage of common labor in California over the
period 1850-52 was 12.5 percent higher than the national average. If the calcula-
tion is made for 1849, the real wage gap in favor of California was 56.1 percent.
33. Estimates for 1850 and 1860 of capital in manufacturing (in current dollars)
and of population are from DeBow (1853) and Kennedy (1862). Nominal capital
per person is deflated by Berry's overall price index (1984, 235, col. 1). Improved
acres and wheat output are from Kennedy (1862, 196, 200). For further discussion
of the emergence of California agriculture during the Gold Rush period, see
Gerber(1993).
34. The elasticity of labor supply appears to have been somewhat smaller in the
case of the Australian Gold Rush. According to Maddock and McLean (1984,
1065), real wages in Victoria increased by 85 percent between 1850 and 1852.
Maddock and McLean do not report labor quantities, but using population or net
migration (see Maddock and McLean 1984, 1048) as a substitute yields elasticities
ranging from 1.3 (population) to 1.7 (net migration). My estimates of the medium-
run labor supply elasticity into Gold Rush California (e.g., 1848-51) are in the
same range as Rosenbloom's (1991, 435) estimate (ELW = 1.96) for common labor
in the building trades in the late nineteenth century, which is derived from cross-
city differences in wages and employment.
35. The assumption that daily hours of work in Gold Rush California did not
increase biases the elasticity downward, compared with the Alaska figure. How-
ever, daily hours of work in Gold Rush California would have had to increase
to more than twenty-four hours per day—obviously impossible—to equal the
Alaska elasticity.
36. It is possible that my estimates of the labor supply elasticities into Gold
Rush California are biased upward because of uncertainty. Some individuals may
have been attracted to California by the (small) prospect of striking it rich rather
than by the average returns to migration; faced with an alternative decision in
which the prospective argonaut was guaranteed the average returns, the decision
would have been to stay in the East (or wherever the place of origin).
37. However, it is easy to overstate the degree to which the antebellum labor
supply was less flexible than today's in response to geographically localized shocks
to labor demand. The evidence on real wages and labor supply elasticities in this
chapter suggests that labor supply adjustment to the discovery of gold per se was
essentially completed by the early to mid-1850s, the traditional dating of the end
of the rush, lasting five to seven years. Recent work by Blanchard and Katz (1992)
has examined the adjustment process of state economies to shocks to labor de-
mand over the post-World War II period. According to Blanchard and Katz
(1992, 33), the effects of shocks on labor supply to the average state take six to
seven years to dissipate, similar to the duration of the adjustment period in the
case of the Gold Rush. Blanchard and Katz also find that much of the short-run178 Notes to Pages 137^4
adjustment to negative demand shocks comes in the form of higher unemployment
rather than lower wages. Two years after a negative shock to labor demand of 1
percent, wages fall by about 0.2 percent, compared with about a 0.25 percent de-
cline for labor supply, implying a short-run labor supply elasticity of 1.25, com-
pared with my estimate of 1.01 for California between 1847 and 1849.
38. However, my estimate for common laborers in 1850 of $4.20 per day is rea-
sonably close to the census figure of $5.00 per day. Readjusting my estimate for
artisans for 1850 so that it refers solely to carpenters produces a daily wage of
$6.95, compared with the census estimate of $7.60.
39. Wright (1940, 342) estimates that between 4,200 and 6,350 individuals ar-
rived overland, which I arbitrarily average at 5,000. There are no records of arrivals
by ship at San Francisco for this year, so I assume zero arrivals. However, there
must surely have been some arrivals by ship, which implies that my estimate of
the short-run elasticity is biased downward. For 1849, I sum Wright's estimate of
overland arrivals plus 27 percent of reported arrivals; the 27 percent adjustment
is the ratio of departures (by sea) to arrivals in 1850 (thus, I am assuming that all
departures by sea were permanent). For 1851, I add arrivals by land and sea in
both 1850 and 1851, again assuming that 27 percent of arrivals by sea in 1851
were permanent. Finally, I multiply the population estimates for 1847-52 by 0.77,
the assumed ratio of adult men aged fifteen to forty to the total population. All
figures are rounded to the nearest hundred. Note that I am assuming that all men
in this age group in California were in the labor force (labor force participation
rates for adult men of all ages in 1850 were close to 90 percent [see Weiss 1992])
or, equivalently, that the labor force participation rate in California did not change
much over the Gold Rush (if it rose, then my labor supply elasticities are biased
downward). The labor supply estimates for California are as follows: 1847-Feb-
ruary 1848, 11,500; March-December 1848, 15,400; 1849, 55,800; 1850, 71,600;
1851, 144,800; 1852, 203,300; and 1860, 186,200.
40. The 1850 federal census estimate of population is understated because of
damage to certain census manuscripts. The understatement produces a downward
bias in my estimate of the labor supply elasticity for that year.
Chapter 7
1. The occupational shares are 0.71 for unskilled laborers, 0.21 for artisans, and
0.08 for white-collar workers. To obtain these shares, I first summed the number
of common laborers, teamsters, and artisans in the building trades (carpenters,
masons, plasterers, painters, and glaziers) and clerks reported in the 1850 census
(DeBow 1854, 126-28). The unskilled labor share is the share of common laborers
and teamsters in the total (= 924,255/1,301,807); the artisan share is the share of
building tradesmen in the total (276,229/1,301,807); the white-collar share is the
share of clerks in the total (101,325). Adding in additional white-collar or artisanal
occupations does not alter the substantive results.
2. To be fair, my aggregate real wage series exclude certain groups—the most
important being slaves and free female labor—that contributed to the growth of
total output, along with a variety of occupations not represented in the army data.
3. Poor harvests in the Northeast in the mid-18 30s and in Europe in the early
1850s may be other examples of (negative) real shocks (see Sokoloffand Villaflor
1992). According to Sokoloffand Villaflor, the demand for labor fell as a result of
the agricultural supply shock in the 1830s, producing declines in real wages of
farm labor (and, by inference, common labor) in the mid-1830s (see chap. 3, tableNotes to Pages 144-51 179
3A.9). However, the price level began rising in the early 1830s, well before the
alleged harvest failures (see table 3A.3 above; and Temin 1969).
4. The differential rates of growth of skilled and unskilled immigrants suggest
that the skill differential ought to have risen in the Northeast in the 1850s, that
being where the majority of immigrants arrived; in fact, the differential did in-
crease by 9.2 percent comparing the 1850s to the 1840s (see chap. 3).
5. If the regression is estimated in first-differences, the coefficient is -0.90 (t =
7.73).
6. The correlation might also be biased away from zero because the nominal
wage series were constructed from hedonic regressions that did not fit the data
perfectly; hence, some of the year-to-year movement in real wages reflects the pre-
diction error of the hedonic regressions (Williamson 1992). However, it should be
kept in mind that the hedonic method is simply a way of producing an average; if,
according to the regression, wages on average did not keep pace with prices during
periods of inflation, it follows that, at the individual level, some wages moved in
the opposite direction.
7. In general, antebellum consumers had three sources of retail supply: general
stores, public markets, and direct purchases from manufacturers. For perishable
items, often obtained from public markets, it is reasonable to assume that price
fluctuations were felt directly (and immediately) by consumers regardless of the
source of supply. Manufacturers supplied wholesale markets as well as consumers,
so it is reasonable to suppose that, in these cases, annual price fluctuations at the
wholesale and retail levels were similar. General stores obtained goods directly
from wholesale markets or from jobbers. General stores tended to replenish their
stocks twice a year or so; because there were few, if any, contractual mechanisms
to hedge price risk, it is reasonable to assume that antebellum retailers passed on
some portion of wholesale price fluctuations. However, if the retail markup were
more stable than wholesale prices, retail prices would fluctuate less than wholesale
prices. This would be true, e.g., if general stores possessed some local monopoly
power. On antebellum wholesale and retail marketing, see Jones (1937).
8. This is particularly true for the nonbenchmark years for which David and
Solar interpolated using prices in Vermont for goods not regularly traded in whole-
sale markets.
9. Effectively, I am assuming that the price of housing relative to that of other
goods did not change between the late 1830s and the early 1840s.
10. However, there is evidence of downward rigidity of nominal wages: wage
cuts in the early 1840s were slightly less than half price declines. Unemployment
is thought to have been high in the early 1840s, and the downward rigidity may
be an important reason why (but see Temin 1969).
11. Stable here does not necessarily mean "constant," only that deviations from
the "normal" price level are well understood (as in the case of seasonality) or long-
term trends (as in the Midwest, where the long-term trend in prices was upward).
12. Note that abrupt adjustments are evident in the wage series. For example,
nominal wages of common labor jumped sharply in 1837 in the Northeast and
Midwest and declined sharply in both regions in 1840.
13. The historical literature on height is now voluminous. A representative re-
cent selection of papers may be found in Steckel and Floud (1997).
14. Komlos has tried to bolster his case by presenting estimates of food con-
sumption that suggest declines for the relevant cohorts, although this has been
disputed by Robert Gallman (1996) (for a reply, see Komlos [1996]).
15. Specifically, Weir (1997, 179) shows that median adult height at age twenty
is positively and significantly correlated with the real wage at approximately age180 Notes to Pages 151-56
twenty. For the sake of argument, I will assume that the effect would be the same
if the real wage were measured from birth to age four.
16. It is reasonable to assume a positive income elasticity of demand for nutri-
ents on the basis of the French results because Weir (1997, 173) shows that real
wages and per capita meat consumption were positively related at the depart-
ment level.
17.1 use Weir's (1997, table 5.4, col. 2b) regression, which reports the coefficient
of a pooled time-series cross-sectional regression of median adult height (age
twenty) on the real wage. All variables are measured at the department level. To
convert the coefficient (16.88) into an elasticity, I use the average height of the 1843
birth cohort (1,647.2 centimeters), the midyear of birth years covered in Weir's
study. Thus, the elasticity of height with respect to the real wage is 0.01 (=
16.88/1,647.2).
18. However, Komlos and Coclanis also show that heights continued to decline
among the birth cohorts of the 1840s, when, according to my estimates, real wages
in the South Atlantic were higher than they were in the 1830s. The only way to
explain the reversal of the correlation in the 1840s is to argue that the sharp rises
in real wages in the early 1840s are not an indication of rises in labor welfare but
a consequence of nominal wage rigidity that produced rising unemployment.
19. The finding that the ratio of artisans' pay to common laborers' pay fell before
the Civil War appears to contradict evidence put forth by Williamson and Lindert
(1980). Williamson and Lindert present two series of skilled-unskilled wage ratios,
the first constructed from data collected by Carroll Wright (1885) and the second
a linked series constructed by splicing together certain of the wage series discussed
in chap. 2. Both series, which pertain primarily to artisans, show substantial in-
creases in artisan-unskilled wage ratios from the 1820s to the 1850s, the opposite
of my findings. Elsewhere, however, it is demonstrated that the increase evident in
the series based on the Carroll Wright data is a consequence of failing to control
for changes in the composition of Wright's sample over time and that the increase
evident in the linked series is a consequence of too low a level of skilled wages in
the 1820s. For a detailed discussion of these points, see Margo and Villaflor (1987).
20. Habakkuk (1962,23) asserted that the "premium on artisan skills was gener-
ally lower in America than England in the early nineteenth century." My findings
do not support Habakkuk. According to Williamson (1985, 13), the skill differen-
tial for artisans (ser. 4H, building trades) compared to nonfarm common laborers
(ser. 2L) was 1.51 in the 1820s (this is an unweighted average of the skill differen-
tials for 1819 and 1827). My estimate for the American Northeast (Habakkuk's
focus since he was concerned with industrialization) is 1.67 for the 1820s (this is
the ratio of the decadal average daily wage for artisans to that for common labor-
ers, from chap. 3). (See also Adams 1968.)
21. Here a caveat is in order. Recall from chap. 3 that I am not able to control
for years of work experience in the hedonic wage regressions. It is possible that
the rising return to white-collar labor reflects changes in the composition of the
sample such that the average clerk was more experienced later in the period than
earlier. If this were true, and if experience had a positive effect on wages (as it
does today), then I would be overstating the extent to which the white-collar skill
differential grew during the antebellum period.
22. The ratio for the nation as a whole is computed from the national series of
nominal wages in chap. 5. A monthly wage for common labor is computed by
multiplying the daily wage by twenty-six days. This overstates the monthly com-
mon wage because no adjustment is made for an unemployment risk premium (see
chap. 3); hence, the wage ratio is biased downward. Goldin's estimates (see alsoNotes to Page 157 181
Goldin and Katz 1995, table 5) are based on annual earnings. If, as seems plausi-
ble, white-collar workers labored for more days per year than common laborers,
my estimate of 2.07 for the 1850s would be biased downward on an annual, as well
as a monthly, basis.
23. Goldin and Katz (1995) also report much higher wage ratios for the South
than for the rest of the United States.